Since the corruption scandal of December 2013, Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan has waged an all-out war against the Gülen (or Hizmet)
movement. The anti-Gülenist campaign started with the closing of private
tutoring centers operated by members of the movement and was followed by
the jailing and mistreatment of journalists, bureaucrats, and businessmen
who were claimed to have connections with the movement. The operation has
become Erdoğan’s main source of legitimacy in recent years. Erdoğan has not
only utilized the brute force of the state apparatus, but also the soft
power of manipulation and propaganda, to suppress and criminalize the
movement and tarnish its reputation around the world.
Erdoğan’s strategy against the Gülen movement can be characterized by “the
Diversionary Theory of War” in political science, according to which
leaders generate foreign policy crises to divert the public’s attention
from discontent with their rule and to bolster their political fortunes
through a “rally ‘round the flag.” By exploiting existing religious and
ethnic cleavages and dubbing some civil society organizations, including
the Gülen movement, as national security threats, Erdoğan has long chosen
to rule on dissonance and difference and has practiced the Diversionary
Theory of War within domestic politics through the demonization of domestic
actors.
A prime example of tactic in Erdoğan’s policy was his classification of the
Gülen movement as a terrorist organization. By equating the movement with
radical terrorist organizations such as ISIS [1], he hoped to shatter and
alter the favorable global perception of the movement and its activities.
However, this intense psychological and rhetorical warfare did not serve
any purpose but to harm the country’s credibility abroad, as the
categorization of the movement as a terrorist organization was found to be
irrational and inconsistent with Erdoğan’s former attitudes toward it. His
fight against the movement has been perceived as a continuation of his
power games and as an indication of his increasing authoritarianism in the
country [2]
.
Erdoğan’s diversionary political tactics are also reflected in his
portrayal of foreign actors. For example, in order to appeal to his voter
base, the conservative and nationalist masses within Turkey, he recently
claimed that a new type of crusade has started between Christian Europe and
the Islamic Middle East, between the cross and the crescent [3]. This is
both anachronistic and antagonistic that does nothing but consolidate his
power through the fictitious creation of an enemy. It undermines the
dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Turkey, and between the East
and the West in general.
Which Erdoğan is the real Erdoğan? Is it the one expressing this
antagonizing and polarizing worldview or the one who founded the alliance
of civilizations in 2005, in an effort to defuse the tensions between the
Western and Islamic worlds? The answer is neither, for there are various
types of Erdoğans, each fitting a different situation. For instance, the
Erdoğan of 2005 was a reformist which gained him the support of Liberals
and EU advocates. This support translated into electoral victories and
prestige abroad. Whereas the Erdoğan of the 2010s has been extremely
concerned and worried about his authority and charisma, in part due to the
corruption scandals and newly emerged foreign policy issues. The Erdoğan of
the 2010s has been adamant and determined to go back to the classical
strategy of divide-and-rule.
His rhetoric over the last half decade is a sign of this shift in political
stratagems. His language is telling: “
The country is in an all-out war and surrounded by internal and
external enemies
”; “the world is on the verge of a new series of crusades”;
“the Gülen Movement is the fifth column and the extension of such dark
forces that are striving to undermine the state and fabric of Turkish
society.”
Erdoğan is the epitome of Machiavelli’s ideal leader as he is, at most,
concerned with his own political career and personal image rather than the
image of the country in the international arena. He may appear to be
subscribing to a Manichean worldview where history is perceived as a
struggle between good and evil, between the divine and evil forces, but
this is a sleight of hand. His nod to this Manichean view of the world is
predicated upon his characterization of events, actors, and personalities
as either favorable or unfavorable to his political interests. The good is
what serves his political interests and the bad is what risks and dooms his
political fortunes, a moral approach that is neither embedded in religious
nor secular understandings of morality.
Even though, Erdoğan has been relatively successful delegitimizing and
suppressing the Gülen movement within Turkey by sidelining and subjugating
the judiciary and state institutions, the dramatic shift in his attitudes
towards the movement has confused the international community [4].
Erdoğan’s last visit to the United States on May 16, 2017, when he came
hoping the U.S. would declare the Gülen movement a terrorist organization,
was even more surprising in that regard. His hopes were in vain, however,
as President Trump consciously avoided characterizing the organization and
its activities as detrimental to American society. This was indicative of
the fact that President Erdoğan was having a hard time justifying his
enmity towards the movement to others and was losing credibility in the
eyes of international actors.
Despite all of this, why does Erdoğan adamantly persist in his global
psychological warfare against the movement? The answer is quite simple. He
wants neither to win nor lose this psychological battle, but rather wants
the Turkish public to believe that he is in an all-out war against the
enemies of the state, embodied by the Gülen movement in the form of a
so-called parallel state. What Erdoğan means by “the protection of the
state” is not the protection of democracy, nor the protection of rule of
law, nor the protection of the separation of powers; rather, he means the
protection of his firm monopoly on power.
This manufacturing of pseudo-domestic and foreign enemies, and the
promotion of a political culture saturated by existential threat
narratives, has disillusioned the public about the meaning of elections in
the country. Over the last five years, the public has constantly been under
the impression that they were not making a choice between different
political parties in the elections, but rather between whether the country
would maintain its existence – by providing Erdoğan with another election
victory – or submit itself to chaos and destruction. This way of framing
the elections, coupled with intense pro-government propaganda and the
banning of many liberal and critical newspapers, media outlets, and social
media platforms such as Twitter, and even Wikipedia, has left almost no
room for political dissent, resistance, and advocacy on the part of civil
society.
In a nutshell, Erdoğan’s divisive political rhetoric and his attempts to
foster anti-Gülenist sentiments have perfectly served his own political
interests within the country, but they have not served the country’s
interests in the international arena, as they raise serious doubts about
the credibility and rationality of the state as embodied in Erdoğan’s
personality.
Notes
1.
http://www.newsweek.com/Erdoğan-says-Gülen-kurds-and-isis-are-preparing-invasion-turkey-487120
3.
http://www.dw.com/en/Erdoğan-accuses-eu-of-crusade-against-islam/a-37979126
;
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-eu-headscarf-ban-court-justice-ruling-erdogan-clash-islam-christianity-cross-crescent-a7633276.html
4.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-germany-idUSKBN16P0LQ
Sage Chen, Political analyst, New York
This article has first been published in the special issue of the Fountain Magazine © Blue Dome Press
